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Note 
 
Stimulating Dialogue Between the Courts and 
Congress: Sprucing Up the “Statutory 
Housekeeping” Project 
Jeff Simard* 
Although the federal statutory housekeeping project has 
existed since the 1990s,1 this little-known interbranch commu-
nication project has a great deal of untapped potential. The pro-
ject calls for United States courts of appeals to voluntarily 
submit opinions from court decisions discussing technical flaws 
in statutes to Congress.2 The circuit courts send the opinions 
themselves, without substantial commentary from their au-
thors or court staff, to a variety of offices in the legislative 
branch that may then take whatever actions they see fit in re-
sponse to the opinions.3  
Professors Abbe R. Gluck and Lisa Schultz Bressman’s re-
cent survey of legislative drafters suggests that judges and leg-
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guidance in writing this Note, Professor Herbert Kritzer for his advice on put-
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providing recent data about the statutory housekeeping project and offering 
his thoughts about the project and this Note, and M. Douglass Bellis and Mat-
thew Lee Wiener for their insights about the statutory housekeeping project. A 
special thanks also goes to the staff of the Minnesota Law Review for helping 
prepare this Note for publication, and to my brother, Justin, for his immensely 
helpful feedback throughout the researching, writing, and editing process. Fi-
nally, I would like to thank my family for all of their support during law 
school. Copyright © 2015 by Jeff Simard.  
 1. Robert A. Katzmann & Russell R. Wheeler, A Mechanism for “Statuto-
ry Housekeeping”: Appellate Courts Working with Congress, 9 J. APP. PRAC. & 
PROCESS 131, 133–36 (2007) (describing the procedure of the federal statutory 
housekeeping project). 
 2. Id. at 136–38 (same). 
 3. Id.  
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islative drafters read and understand statutes differently,4 yet 
their study does not devote any time to the federal statutory 
housekeeping project,5 one mechanism that already exists for 
improving interbranch communication. If used properly, the 
project stands to foster communication between judges and 
drafters, encourage forward-thinking draftsmanship, and im-
prove statutory interpretation.  
In its current form, however, the project is insufficient. 
Participation is weak and uneven among the circuits,6 and re-
cent attempts at revitalization have not led to broader partici-
pation.7 Recipients of opinions submitted through the project 
find them helpful,8 but they use them merely as a training tool 
rather than as a way to promote dialogue between the judiciary 
and Congress as was initially intended.9  
This Note argues that the federal statutory housekeeping 
project can realize its potential as a tool for effective 
interbranch communication only if properly reformed and ex-
panded. Part I introduces the federal statutory housekeeping 
project, tracing its development from the project’s historical 
roots to its present day structure. Based partially on interviews 
with those affected by and involved in the federal project, Part 
II analyzes contemporary use of the project, ultimately arguing 
that its infrequent use and narrow focus limit its ability to 
promote communication and improve statutes. In Part III, this 
 
 4. Abbe R. Gluck & Lisa Schultz Bressman, Statutory Interpretation 
from the Inside—An Empirical Study of Congressional Drafting, Delegation, 
and the Canons: Part I, 65 STAN. L. REV. 901, 933–40 (2013) (describing how 
the commonly followed judicial statutory canon of the rule against superflui-
ties, the whole act and whole code rules, and the judicial use of dictionaries to 
determine plain meaning usually do not reflect legislative drafting practice). 
 5. See id. 
 6. See Memorandum from Russell Wheeler, President, The Governance 
Inst., to author (Sept. 12, 2013) (on file with author) (providing a breakdown of 
court participation in the federal statutory housekeeping project since 2007). 
 7. See, e.g., Feedback on Technical Matters Aids Legislation, THIRD 
BRANCH, Feb. 2010, at 4, available at http://www.uscourts.gov/News/ 
TheThirdBranch/TTBViewer.aspx?doc=/uscourts/news/ttb/archive/2010 
-02%20Feb.pdf [hereinafter Feedback] (publicizing the federal statutory 
housekeeping project).  
 8. Telephone Interview with M. Douglass Bellis, Senior Counsel, Office 
of the Legislative Counsel, United States House of Representatives (Sept. 24, 
2013); E-mail from Russell Wheeler, President, The Governance Inst., to au-
thor (Sept. 19, 2013, 10:31 CDT) (on file with author). 
 9. Telephone Interview with M. Douglass Bellis, supra note 8 (discussing 
how the project helps develop legislative counsel drafting techniques rather 
than generate individual congressional legislative responses). 
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Note draws lessons from state interbranch communication pro-
grams. It proposes increasing two-way feedback between judges 
and legislators within the housekeeping project, formalizing it, 
and supplementing the project with educational programs. This 
Note concludes that a three-part solution would greatly help 
the federal statutory housekeeping project realize its potential, 
bridge the gap between judicial statutory interpretation and 
legislative drafting, and improve relations between the federal 
Judiciary and Congress. 
I.  THE HISTORICAL ROOTS AND DEVELOPMENT OF THE 
FEDERAL STATUTORY HOUSEKEEPING PROJECT   
The federal statutory housekeeping project draws inspira-
tion from earlier work describing how weak interbranch com-
munications exacerbate technical flaws in statutes.10 This early 
work explains why the statutory housekeeping project exists 
and provides a way to measure its success. Section A of this 
Part notes how action by a single branch cannot solve the prob-
lem of gaps and defects in statutes. Section B traces the devel-
opment of the D.C. Circuit pilot version of the housekeeping 
project, detailing how its founders envisioned and developed 
the project as a response to the issues discussed in Section A. 
Section C then describes the current structure of the house-
keeping project, setting the stage for Part II’s analysis of the 
project’s usage and effectiveness today. 
A. IDENTIFICATION OF THE PROBLEMS OF STATUTORY DEFECTS 
AND LACKLUSTER INTERBRANCH COMMUNICATION 
The federal statutory housekeeping project developed from 
prior attempts to improve interbranch communication.11 As ear-
ly as 1921, Benjamin Cardozo noted that “courts and legisla-
tures work in separation and aloofness.”12 Cardozo argued that 
when legislatures created ambiguous legislation, they invited 
judges to engage in their own sort of lawmaking to try to make 
sense out of confusing statutes.13 According to Cardozo, the 
 
 10. E.g., Robert A. Katzmann, Madison Lecture, Statutes, 87 N.Y.U. L. 
REV. 637, 686–87 (2012); Katzmann & Wheeler, supra note 1, at 131–32. 
 11. See supra note 10.  
 12. Benjamin N. Cardozo, A Ministry of Justice, 35 HARV. L. REV. 113, 113 
(1921). 
 13. See id. at 115–16 (discussing the idea that leaving statutory ambigui-
ties to judges causes them to create judge-made law which can result in more 
uncertainties). 
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problem with this implicit delegation was not just that judge-
made law itself can be difficult to shape, but also that the orig-
inal “ugly or antiquated or unjust rule” that created the predic-
ament in the first place remains even after judges try to make 
good of it.14 Thus, while remedying this root issue requires leg-
islative action, getting legislatures to fix statutory flaws is in-
credibly difficult because courts and legislatures isolate them-
selves from each other.15  
Dean Roscoe Pound elaborated upon the problem of statu-
tory defects, situating it within Congress’s modernized lawmak-
ing environment. Pound noted that as laws grew increasingly 
complex, discovering and proposing a solution to a statutory de-
fect became the province of experts, making reform harder.16 
Moreover, the incentives of modern lawmaking did not favor 
statutory reform. The revision of relatively low-key provisions 
of private law would neither garner legislators much publicity, 
nor generate favors from other legislators.17 Since legislators 
were often focused on what appeared to be more pressing and 
timely concerns, they rarely considered how judges would in-
terpret that legislation in the future.18 Other times, legislation 
would pass without an in-depth review because of interest 
group pressure.19 Pound, linking his analysis with Cardozo’s 
discussion, noted how this lack of legislative foresight encour-
aged judicial freewheeling in statutory interpretation.20 Writing 
a decade after Pound, Judge Friendly explained how statutory 
gaps and defects obscure the boundaries of judicial action.21 To 
the extent that statutes were intended to limit judicial discre-
tion, or operate in its place, statutory flaws created a problem 
that judges were unequipped to solve.22 In that sense, legisla-
tures diminished the role of judges insofar as they “occup[ied] 
 
 14. Id. at 116; see Henry J. Friendly, The Gap in Lawmaking—Judges 
Who Can’t and Legislators Who Won’t, 63 COLUM. L. REV. 787, 798–99 (1963) 
(“Sometimes, when the ambiguity is confined, a court’s construction of a stat-
ute can set matters right for good and all. But generally, the best the judge 
can do is to keep the ship afloat, in better shape or worse, in the hope that res-
cue will arrive.”). 
 15. See Cardozo, supra note 12, at 113–14, 116. 
 16. Roscoe Pound, A Ministry of Justice: A New Role for the Law School, 
38 A.B.A. J. 637, 638 (1952). 
 17. Id.  
 18. Id. at 703. 
 19. See id. 
 20. Id. 
 21. Friendly, supra note 14, at 792. 
 22. Id. 
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vast fields” of the law with statutes, but failed to “keep them 
ploughed” by addressing the problems caused by their plethora 
of statutes.23 Indeed, many of these statutory problems were 
long-standing.24 Yet, the reason for the absence of legislative 
improvement of statutes was not strong opposition, but a lack 
of time and attention.25  
B. THE D.C. PILOT STATUTORY HOUSEKEEPING PROJECT 
Informed by the critiques of Cardozo, Pound, Friendly, and 
others, the federal statutory housekeeping project began as a 
pilot program initiated at the invitation of the D.C. Circuit.26  
1. Genesis of the D.C. Pilot Program 
A study conducted by Judge Frank Coffin, Robert 
Katzmann, and the Governance Institute27 laid the groundwork 
for the D.C. Circuit pilot project.28 The study focused on fifteen 
opinions selected by D.C. Circuit judges that described tech-
nical errors in statutes such as grammatical problems, mis-
placed commas, ambiguities, and gaps.29 Coffin and Katzmann 
categorized these opinions and Katzmann sent them, along 
with related legislative history, to the relevant legislative staff-
ers on various committees.30 In interviews, Katzmann discov-
 
 23. See id. (“What I do lament is that the legislator has diminished the 
role of the judge by occupying vast fields and then has failed to keep them 
ploughed.”). 
 24. See id. at 793–95 (mentioning examples of statutes with long-standing 
technical flaws). 
 25. Id. at 793 (“Yet most of the questions involved, although debatable, 
are not of the sort as to which the opposing forces are so evenly balanced as to 
prevent legislative change; the problem is rather lack of time and attention.”). 
 26. Robert A. Katzmann & Stephanie M. Herseth, An Experiment in Stat-
utory Communication Between Courts and Congress: A Progress Report, 85 
GEO. L.J. 2189, 2192 (1997). 
 27. “The Governance Institute is a small non-profit, non-partisan organi-
zation that since its 1986 incorporation in Washington, D.C. has explored and 
sought to ease specific problems associated with both the separation and divi-
sion of powers in the American federal system.” About, THE GOVERNANCE 
INST., http://www.thegovernanceinstitute.org/about (last visited Nov. 17, 
2014). The Governance Institute largely focuses on problems in the admin-
istration of justice, particularly those related to relations between the courts 
and Congress, and problems of the administrative state. Id. 
 28. Proceedings of the Forty-Ninth Judicial Conference of the D.C. Cir-
cuit, 124 F.R.D. 241, 323–25 (1989); Katzmann & Herseth, supra note 26, at 
2192–93. 
 29. 124 F.R.D. at 323; Katzmann & Herseth, supra note 26, at 2192. 
 30. 124 F.R.D. at 323. 
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ered that congressional staffers generally only paid close atten-
tion to major cases and were unaware of twelve out of the fif-
teen court decisions.31 
After analyzing the results of the Governance Institute 
study, Katzmann, Coffin, and others at the Governance Insti-
tute came to understand that both branches supported some 
means of conveying relevant judicial opinions to Congress.32 
They envisioned that “transmission belt of sorts” as low-key.33 
In order to facilitate the correction of technical errors, the solu-
tion needed to be respectful of the prerogatives of both branch-
es, relatively unburdensome, and technically sound.34 With the-
se concerns in mind, the D.C. Circuit and the Governance 
Institute worked together with key participants in the U.S. 
House to build an interbranch communication project35 and 
launched it in 199236 to a warm reception by the Judiciary and 
Congress.37 It would come to be informally known as the “statu-
tory housekeeping” project based on then Judge Ruth Bader 
Ginsburg’s earlier description of the need to clean up statutory 
drafting flaws.38 
2. An Early Progress Report 
The D.C. Circuit pilot housekeeping project depended on 
participation from both the judicial and legislative sides.39 As 
designed, the D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals would transmit 
opinions concerning grammatical errors,40 ambiguities,41 and 
 
 31. Id. at 323–24. 
 32. Katzmann & Herseth, supra note 26, at 2193. 
 33. Id. 
 34. Id. 
 35. Id. at 2193–94. 
 36. The project was first launched by the House and was implemented by 
the Senate a few months later. Id. at 2194.  
 37. Id. 
 38. Id. at 2189–90 n.3 (quoting Ruth Bader Ginsburg & Peter W. Huber, 
The Intercircuit Committee, 100 HARV. L. REV. 1417, 1428 (1987)). 
 39. See Katzmann, supra note 10, at 687–94 (discussing the statutory 
housekeeping project in the context of interbranch communication regarding 
statutes); Katzmann & Herseth, supra note 26, at 2190 (describing how the 
project was “committed to the view that improved communication between the 
branches would improve the work of both branches”). 
 40. M. Douglass Bellis, Commentary, A View from the House of Repre-
sentatives, 85 GEO. L.J. 2209, 2210 (1997). 
 41. Id. at 2211–12. Bellis also noted that “[m]any ambiguities in statutory 
language arise from political compromises, which are inevitably part of the 
democratic process” and that the statutory housekeeping project “serves as a 
useful means for political actors to discover whose interpretation prevailed” 
SIMARD_4FMT 1/6/2015 3:25 PM 
2015] STATUTORY HOUSEKEEPING 1201 
 
gaps in statutes42 to Congress.43 The program assigned respon-
sibility not to judges but to the D.C. Circuit’s clerk and staff at-
torneys to determine which opinions should be submitted to 
Congress.44 Over time, the D.C. Circuit clerk of court and staff 
attorneys began to develop filtering mechanisms to make this 
process easier.45 These filtering mechanisms resulted in the 
submission of a relatively small number of opinions discussing 
statutory defects.46 
The chosen opinions were received and addressed by the 
Offices of Legislative Counsel in the House and Senate,47 bodies 
that operate on an attorney-client relationship with legislators 
and legislative staff and assist in statute drafting.48 The two 
Legislative Counsel offices used the opinions as case studies for 
the training of staff and as a basis for reviewing and redevelop-
ing drafting rules.49 The Legislative Counsel offices also sent 
the chosen opinions to relevant committees.50 
Usage of the submitted opinions in Congress was limited: 
Members of Congress took no legislative action in response to 
 
when a provision was drafted with two competing interpretations in mind. Id. 
at 2211 n.10.  
 42. Id. at 2212–13. 
 43. Id. at 2209. 
 44. Mark J. Langer, Commentary, Implementing the Project: A Court Ad-
ministrator’s Role, 85 GEO. L.J. 2219, 2219 (1997). 
 45. Id. at 2219–20. For example, statutory construction cases featuring 
divided panels or a divided en banc court often would end up qualifying for the 
project, while cases where the Court deferred to an agency’s interpretation 
were normally omitted from submission. Id. 
 46. Id. at 2220–21 (noting that implementing the project did not impose a 
heavy burden on staff attorneys and that relatively few opinions were submit-
ted).  
 47. See Bellis, supra note 40, at 2210 (explaining how House legislative 
counsels were responsible for sending opinions to the appropriate committee 
staff); Frank Burk, Commentary, Statutory Housekeeping: A Senate Perspec-
tive, 85 GEO. L.J. 2217, 2217 (1997) (describing how the Senate Legislative 
Counsel’s Office found the project helpful and played a role in transmitting 
opinions to the relevant committee staff). 
 48. See Burk, supra note 47, at 2218 (“Because the Senate Legislative 
Counsel’s Office has an attorney-client relationship with the committees, it 
could report on the project only with the express consent of the committees in-
volved.”). 
 49. Id. at 2217 (describing how the project prompted a two-year review of 
drafting rules used by the Senate Legislative Counsel’s Office, led to the de-
velopment of drafting manual, and provided case studies for the training of 
staff); see Telephone Interview with M. Douglass Bellis, supra note 8 (noting 
that the federal statutory housekeeping project was used for training staff in 
the House Legislative Counsel’s Office). 
 50. See supra note 47 and accompanying text. 
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the D.C. Circuit opinions51 and committee use of the opinions 
was varied and uneven.52 In turn, key participants in the pro-
gram recommended reevaluating the criteria for choosing opin-
ions53 and developing a more two-sided communication pro-
cess.54  
The Congressional Legislative Counsel offices, however, 
found the project helpful. They used the opinions to identify 
problems that past drafting had caused for judicial statutory 
interpretation and to improve drafting procedures.55 For them, 
the project was not about “find[ing] ‘mistakes’ that Congress 
[had] made and should correct,” but rather opening communi-
cation so that “Congress can learn how the courts are reacting 
to and interpreting statutes.”56 Observers of the D.C. pilot pro-
ject found the relatively simple structure of the project appeal-
ing.57 It neither consumed judges’ time nor distracted legisla-
tors from their most important duties.58 Instead, the project 
was directed at those in the legislative branch most concerned 
with the technical details of statutes, the Legislative Counsels, 
who could give the opinions the time and attention they de-
served.59 Based on these perceived advantages of the pilot pro-
gram, participants suggested expanding it to cover all of the 
U.S. courts of appeals.60  
 
 51. Bellis, supra note 40, at 2213. 
 52. Burk, supra note 47, at 2217. 
 53. See id. at 2218 (“It may be time to reassess the project’s guidelines.”). 
 54. See Bellis, supra note 40, at 2214 (arguing that communication be-
tween the branches should be a two-way street); see also Proceedings of the 
Forty-Ninth Judicial Conference of the D.C. Circuit, 124 F.R.D. 241, 324 
(1989) (explaining that legislative staff believed it would be helpful if the 
courts could be informed of any actions taken by Congress in response to sub-
mitted opinions). 
 55. See Bellis, supra note 40, at 2213; see also Burk, supra note 48, at 
2217 (“From the perspective of the office responsible for much of the legislative 
drafting done in the Senate, the project has been a success, although perhaps 
not quite in the way those who developed the project expected.”). 
 56. Bellis, supra note 40, at 2213. 
 57. James L. Buckley, Commentary, The Perspective of a Judge and For-
mer Legislator, 85 GEO. L.J. 2223, 2224 (1997) (“The [statutory housekeeping] 
project’s virtue is its simplicity.”). 
 58. See id. (describing how the structure of the project suits judges and 
members of Congress).  
 59. See id. (discussing how those in charge of drafting statutes, the two 
Legislative Counsel’s offices, were in favor of the project). 
 60. Bellis, supra note 40, at 2213–14 (listing examples of statutory flaws 
that judges encounter in other circuits to suggest that it would be helpful to 
expand the project); Buckley, supra note 57, at 2224 (“In light of the Judicial 
Conference’s recommendation that all circuits join the project, I would think 
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C. CURRENT STRUCTURE OF THE PROJECT 
Today, over fifteen years after the federal statutory house-
keeping project was expanded, the project has retained a simi-
lar structure to that of the D.C. pilot program.61 Depending on 
the circuit court, either the clerk of the court, staff attorneys, or 
judges identify appropriate opinions to be sent to Congress.62 
These individuals have flexibility in the identification process 
since there is no strict definition of which opinions may be 
submitted; rather, there is a general guideline that they ad-
dress grammatical errors, ambiguities, or gaps in statutory 
provisions.63  
Once identified, the clerk of the court sends the opinion to 
the Speaker of the House and President Pro Tempore of the 
Senate, and submits copies to the Judiciary committees, the 
House and Senate Offices of Legislative Counsel, the General 
Counsel of the Administrative Office of the U.S. Courts, and 
the Governance Institute.64 The opinions are submitted without 
substantive commentary to avoid inappropriate extrajudicial 
action.65  
The Legislative Counsel offices pay the most attention to 
the submitted opinions.66 After receiving an e-mail with an 
opinion, a Senior Legislative Counsel reads the case and identi-
fies the major statutory drafting issue or issues implicated by 
 
the time is ripe for other courts to consider participating.”); see Katzmann & 
Herseth, supra note 26, at 2195 (mentioning the Judicial Conference’s recom-
mendation and noting that the First, Third, Seventh, and Tenth Circuits have 
also expressed interest in the project); Katzmann & Wheeler, supra note 1, at 
134 (noting then Chief Justice Rehnquist’s endorsement of the pilot project in 
1993). 
 61. Compare discussion of pilot project’s structure, supra Part I.B.2, with 
Katzmann & Wheeler, supra note 1, at 136–38 (explaining the federal statuto-
ry housekeeping project’s current procedure on the judicial side), and Bellis, 
supra note 40 (explaining the statutory housekeeping project’s current proce-
dure on the legislative side).  
 62. Katzmann & Wheeler, supra note 1, at 136. For more information re-
garding the different methods of administering the project, see infra note 100 
and accompanying text. 
 63. Katzmann & Wheeler, supra note 1, at 136–37. 
 64. Id. at 137. 
 65. One suggested letter template simply states, “Enclosed please find an 
opinion of the United States Courts of Appeals for XXX Circuit, which may be 
of interest to the Congress.” Id. at 137 (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 66. Telephone Interview with M. Douglass Bellis, supra note 8 (discussing 
how members of Congress rarely read judicial opinions and few members are 
particularly concerned with the intricacies of statutory language that are the 
domain of the Legislative Counsel’s offices). 
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it.67 After confirming the drafting issue with the clerk of court,68 
the Senior Legislative Counsel gives the opinion to the Staff 
Legislative Counsel who specializes in the area of law at issue, 
and to the relevant subcommittee staff counsel for his or her 
consideration.69  
Early articulations of the link between technical flaws in 
statutes and lackluster interbranch communication played a 
key role in shaping the purpose and structure of the federal 
statutory housekeeping project.70 That project received largely 
positive feedback from Congress and the judiciary during its 
launch in pilot form in 1992 and from key participants in the 
project several years later.71 Yet, shortfalls of the project point-
ed out during its pilot stage have largely been unaddressed 
even as it has been expanded to include all of the circuits. Low 
participation in the project suggests that the statutory house-
keeping project is not serving the function of an interbranch 
“transmission belt”72 today as its supporters hoped it would 
when it launched fifteen years ago.73  
II.  THE FEDERAL STATUTORY HOUSEKEEPING 
PROJECT’S UNREALIZED POTENTIAL   
The federal statutory housekeeping project’s ability to ad-
dress the problems associated with lackluster interbranch 
communications depends on the participation of the federal ju-
diciary and Congress. Participation, however, has been weak 
and inconsistent, preventing the project from reaching its po-
tential. 
Section A of this Part evaluates recent judicial participa-
tion in the federal statutory housekeeping project, concludes 
that such participation is both low and uneven, and suggests 
several possible explanations for the lack of participation. Sec-
tion B addresses usage of the project by legislators and legisla-
tive counsels, argues that legislative use of the project is fairly 
narrow in focus, and offers potential reasons for that narrow 
 
 67. Id. 
 68. Id. 
 69. Id. 
 70. Katzmann, supra note 10, at 686–88 (linking earlier proposals regard-
ing statutory revision and interbranch communication with the federal statu-
tory housekeeping project). 
 71. See supra notes 36–37, 55–60 and accompanying text. 
 72. Katzmann & Herseth, supra note 26, at 2193. 
 73. See infra Part II.  
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usage. Section C then explains why low rates of participation 
are disconcerting by articulating the importance of interbranch 
communication. It argues, however, that the federal statutory 
housekeeping project could be an effective tool of interbranch 
dialogue if used properly.  
A. JUDICIAL PARTICIPATION IN THE FEDERAL STATUTORY 
HOUSEKEEPING PROJECT IS LOW AND UNEVEN 
The federal statutory housekeeping project does not enjoy 
broad judicial participation. Rather, judicial engagement in the 
project is low and uneven, likely because of a general lack of 
knowledge of the project and concerns about whether it is ap-
propriate for judges to take part in it. This relative lack of judi-
cial participation limits the project’s reach and hinders its ef-
fectiveness. 
1. Participation Among the Circuits 
From July 200774 to August 2014, nine courts of appeals 
submitted forty-six opinions to Congress through the federal 
statutory housekeeping project.75 Of these forty-six opinions,76 
 
 74. July 2007 represents the beginning of efforts to revitalize the statuto-
ry housekeeping project. Katzmann & Wheeler, supra note 1, at 134–35.  
 75. E-mail from Russell Wheeler, President, The Governance Inst., to au-
thor (Aug. 12, 2014, 14:57 CST) (on file with author); see also Memorandum 
from Russell Wheeler to author, supra note 6, at 1. 
 76. The submitted opinions discussed technical defects in statutes relat-
ing to immigration, bankruptcy, commerce and trade, criminal law, food and 
drug regulation, judicial procedure, and labor. Memorandum from Russell 
Wheeler to author, supra note 6, at 2–6. See, e.g., Sterk v. Redbox Automated 
Retail, LLC, 672 F.3d 535, 537–39 (7th Cir. 2012) (discussing whether violat-
ing subsection (d) of the Video Privacy Protection Act may give rise to civil ac-
tions authorized under subsection (c) of that statute); Delrio-Mooci v. Connolly 
Props., Inc., 672 F.3d 241, 248–51 (3d Cir. 2012) (interpreting the breadth of a 
statute criminalizing encouraging or inducing aliens to illegally enter or reside 
in the United States); United States v. Vasquez, 611 F.3d 325, 327–29 (7th 
Cir. 2010) (determining whether a conviction for failure to register under the 
Sex Offender Registration and Notification Act requires evidence that the de-
fendant knew of this federal obligation); Cosmetic Ideas, Inc. v. 
IAC/InteractiveCorp, 606 F.3d 612, 615–18 (9th Cir. 2010) (pointing out an 
ambiguity as to whether a copyright is registered when the Copyright Office 
receives a copyright application or when the Copyright Office issues a certifi-
cate of registration); United States v. Hassan, 542 F.3d 968, 978–80 (2d Cir. 
2008) (discussing whether the Controlled Substance Act is unconstitutionally 
vague for failing to use khat’s common name when prohibiting that sub-
stance); Zedan v. Habash, 529 F.3d 398, 403–05 (7th Cir. 2008) (highlighting a 
gap created by the Bankruptcy Code and the Bankruptcy Rules regarding the 
timing of an objection to a debtor’s discharge). 
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thirteen mentioned gaps in statutes, twenty-eight addressed 
ambiguities, and one highlighted a grammatical error.77  
According to a number of measures, forty-six submitted 
opinions is a low rate of judicial participation in the housekeep-
ing project. First, the forty-six submitted opinions cited thirty 
other recent circuit court opinions discussing the same deficient 
provisions—opinions that the courts could have submitted 
through the project but did not.78 These thirty non-submitted 
opinions are the clearest evidence for judicial underuse because 
the statutory issues they discussed were eligible for submission 
by other courts. 
Second, the uneven submission of opinions suggests that 
participation in some circuits is low. The Seventh Circuit was 
responsible for slightly less than sixty percent of the submitted 
opinions.79 Although judges in the Seventh Circuit generally 
write published opinions in a greater percentage of merit de-
terminations than other courts of appeals,80 the next two courts 
 
 77. Memorandum from Russell Wheeler to author, supra note 6, at 2. The 
four most recent opinions have not yet been categorized. See E-mail from Rus-
sell Wheeler to author, supra note 75. 
 78. Memorandum from Russell Wheeler to author, supra note 6, at 1.  
 79. See E-mail from Russell Wheeler to author, supra note 75. 
 80. See ADMIN. OFFICE OF THE U.S. COURTS, TABLE S-3. U.S. COURTS OF 
APPEALS—TYPES OF OPINIONS OR ORDERS FILED IN CASES TERMINATED ON 
THE MERITS AFTER ORAL HEARINGS OR SUBMISSION ON BRIEFS DURING THE 
12-MONTH PERIOD ENDING SEPTEMBER 30, 2012 (2013), available at 
http://www.uscourts.gov/uscourts/Statistics/JudicialBusiness/2012/tables/ 
S03Sep12.pdf; ADMIN. OFFICE OF THE U.S. COURTS, TABLE S-3. U.S. COURTS 
OF APPEALS—TYPES OF OPINIONS OR ORDERS FILED IN CASES TERMINATED ON 
THE MERITS AFTER ORAL HEARINGS OR SUBMISSION ON BRIEFS DURING THE 
12-MONTH PERIOD ENDING SEPTEMBER 30, 2011 (2012), available at 
http://www.uscourts.gov/uscourts/Statistics/JudicialBusiness/2011/tables/ 
S03Sep11.pdf; ADMIN. OFFICE OF THE U.S. COURTS, TABLE S-3. U.S. COURTS 
OF APPEALS—TYPES OF OPINIONS OR ORDERS FILED IN CASES TERMINATED ON 
THE MERITS AFTER ORAL HEARINGS OR SUBMISSION ON BRIEFS DURING THE 
12-MONTH PERIOD ENDING SEPTEMBER 30, 2010 (2011), available at 
http://www.uscourts.gov/uscourts/Statistics/JudicialBusiness/2010/tables/ 
S03Sep10.pdf; ADMIN. OFFICE OF THE U.S. COURTS, TABLE S-3. U.S. COURTS 
OF APPEALS—TYPES OF OPINIONS OR ORDERS FILED IN CASES TERMINATED ON 
THE MERITS AFTER ORAL HEARINGS OR SUBMISSION ON BRIEFS DURING THE 
12-MONTH PERIOD ENDING SEPTEMBER 30, 2009 (2010), available at 
http://www.uscourts.gov/Statistics/JudicialBusiness/JudicialBusiness.aspx? 
doc=/uscourts/Statistics/JudicialBusiness/2009/tables/S03Sep09.pdf; ADMIN. 
OFFICE OF THE U.S. COURTS, TABLE S-3. U.S. COURTS OF APPEALS—TYPES OF 
OPINIONS OR ORDERS FILED IN CASES TERMINATED ON THE MERITS AFTER 
ORAL HEARINGS OR SUBMISSION ON BRIEFS DURING THE 12-MONTH PERIOD 
ENDING SEPTEMBER 30, 2008 (2009), available at http://www.uscourts 
.gov/uscourts/Statistics/JudicialBusiness/2008/tables/S03Sep08.pdf; ADMIN. 
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by that measure, the First and D.C. Circuits, have submitted 
two and zero opinions respectively since 2007.81 Even if for 
some reason the Seventh Circuit encounters more technical de-
fects in statutes, it is still difficult to explain why its judges 
would see more than four times as many technical flaws in 
statutes than any other circuit.82 If the other participating cir-
cuits see at least half as many of such cases as the Seventh Cir-
cuit does, and there is no clear reason why they would not,83 a 
conservative estimate would be that there are potentially 
eighty or more eligible opinions that have not been submitted.  
Finally, a comparison of the number of opinions submitted 
through the statutory housekeeping project from 2007 to 2014 
to the number of opinions submitted through the pilot project 
from 1992 to 1997 suggests that the project is being underused. 
During the housekeeping project’s pilot project period, thirty-
seven cases were submitted from a single circuit, an average of 
over seven cases per eligible circuit per year.84 From 2007 to 
2014, forty-six cases have been submitted, a much lower aver-
age, about one half of one case per eligible circuit per year.85 
Even if one ignores the circuits that have not submitted any 
opinions since 2007, this comparison is still quite telling. The 
total number of opinions submitted through the project from 
2007 to the present by nine circuits is nearly as many as were 
submitted by the D.C. Circuit alone during the project’s six-
year test run.86 Although an optimist might attribute the de-
cline in submission rate to greater efforts by drafters to clean 
up statutes, that possibility is unlikely. Statute-based law has 
only become more predominant and judges continue to encoun-
ter ambiguous statutes on a frequent basis.87  
 
OFFICE OF THE U.S. COURTS, TABLE S-3. U.S. COURTS OF APPEALS—TYPES OF 
OPINIONS OR ORDERS FILED IN CASES TERMINATED ON THE MERITS AFTER 
ORAL HEARINGS OR SUBMISSION ON BRIEFS DURING THE 12-MONTH PERIOD 
ENDING SEPTEMBER 30, 2007 (2008), available at http://www.uscourts.gov/ 
uscourts/Statistics/JudicialBusiness/2007/tables/S03Sep07.pdf. 
 81. E-mail from Russell Wheeler to author, supra note 75. 
 82. See E-mail from Russell Wheeler to author, supra note 8 (mentioning 
that one reason why the Seventh Circuit submits more opinions than any oth-
er circuit is probably “not because it encounters more drafting problems than 
other courts but rather because the chief judge is committed to the project as 
is the clerk of court”). 
 83. Id. 
 84. Katzmann & Herseth, supra note 26, at 2194–96. 
 85. E-mail from Russell Wheeler to author, supra note 75. 
 86. Id.; Memorandum from Russell Wheeler to author, supra note 6, at 1. 
 87. See Katzmann, supra note 10, at 640, 643–45 (describing the preva-
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The uneven nature of judicial participation in the house-
keeping project deserves greater attention because the effec-
tiveness of the project is limited by both the low number of 
submitted opinions and the lack of meaningful participation by 
most circuits. As mentioned above, the Seventh Circuit current-
ly submits the overwhelming majority of opinions in the pro-
ject, behavior that can be explained more by the commitment of 
its chief judge and clerk of court to the project than to a dispro-
portionate number of statutory issues in that particular court.88 
The Seventh Circuit’s relatively high participation in the pro-
ject contrasts sharply with the zero opinions that four of the 
thirteen federal courts of appeals have submitted since July 
2007.89 Even if one were to discount the lack of participation by 
the Federal Circuit based on its slightly different focus, there is 
no clear reason why the Sixth, Eighth, and D.C. Circuits would 
not have encountered any eligible statutory flaws.90 The D.C. 
Circuit’s failure to submit any opinions is particularly notable 
in light of its role in the creation of the federal statutory house-
keeping project91 and the Circuit’s substantial administrative 
law jurisprudence.92 Its lack of participation in the project today 
prevents many important decisions discussing statutory flaws 
in the context of administrative law from being transmitted to 
Congress.93  
It is possible to argue that the participating circuits’ opin-
ions discuss many of the same statutory provisions and thus 
that the lack of participation by the Sixth, Eighth, and Federal 
Circuits does not hamper the effectiveness of the project over-
all. The aforementioned fact that forty-six submitted opinions 
cited at least thirty other non-transmitted circuit court opin-
 
lence of statutory law and the frequency with which federal judges engage in 
statutory interpretation). 
 88. See supra note 82 and accompanying text.  
 89. E-mail from Russell Wheeler to author, supra note 75. 
 90. See id. (listing which circuits have participated in the statutory 
housekeeping project); E-mail from Russell Wheeler to author, supra note 8 
(suggesting that the reason for a lack of submitted opinions is not due to a dis-
parity in the number of encountered flaws). 
 91. Katzmann & Herseth, supra note 26, at 2194–96. See generally Lang-
er, supra note 44 (detailing the D.C. Circuit’s implementation of the pilot pro-
ject). 
 92. See Telephone Interview with Matthew Lee Wiener, Exec. Dir., Ad-
min. Conference of the U.S. (Sept. 17, 2013) (mentioning that the D.C. Circuit 
makes many decisions addressing administrative law issues). 
 93. Id. (noting that from an administrative law perspective, it would be 
helpful to include D.C. Circuit opinions in the statutory housekeeping project). 
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ions discussing the same statutory sections could be construed 
to support that argument.94 However, it is difficult to claim that 
the housekeeping project is really an effective “transmission 
belt”95 when only some of the circuits participate in it and even 
then only rarely.96  
2. Possible Reasons for Limited Judicial Participation 
The relatively low and uneven rates of judicial participa-
tion in the housekeeping project likely stem from three major 
factors: (1) lack of information about the project; (2) failure to 
prioritize participation; and (3) concerns about separation of 
powers and inappropriate judicial communication.97 All of these 
factors, however, can be addressed with appropriate reforms. 
Perhaps the most obvious reason for the lack of broad judi-
cial participation in the statutory housekeeping project is the 
project’s obscurity. Despite a series of efforts to publicize the 
project since 2007,98 there is some evidence that some judges 
simply are not acquainted with the project or knowledgeable 
about how it works.99 In circuits where judges are primarily re-
sponsible for selecting which opinions are submitted,100 this 
 
 94. E-mail from Russell Wheeler to author, supra note 75; see also Memo-
randum from Russell Wheeler to author, supra note 6, at 1. 
 95. Katzmann & Herseth, supra note 26, at 2193. 
 96. E-mail from Russell Wheeler to author, supra note 75; see also Memo-
randum from Russell Wheeler to author, supra note 6, at 1. 
 97. See Dominick Vetri, Communicating Between Planets: Law Reform for 
the Twenty-First Century, 34 WILLAMETTE L. REV. 169, 177–78 (1998) (men-
tioning six obstacles to interbranch communication: “(1) ingrained negative 
attitudes toward each other’s branch; (2) limited knowledge of each other’s in-
stitutional roles and procedures; (3) lack of a designated judicial spokesperson; 
(4) conflict created by institutional checks and balances; (5) judicial caution in 
approaching the legislature; and (6) lack of clear guidelines for judicial partic-
ipation”). 
 98. See, e.g., Feedback, supra note 7, at 4 (stating that judges received 
memos reminding them about the project).  
 99. See E-mail from Russell Wheeler to author, supra note 8 (suggesting 
that some judges may not be aware of the project); E-mail from Russell 
Wheeler, President, The Governance Inst., to author (Sept. 12, 2013, 11:53 
EDT) (on file with author) (mentioning the existence of some misconceptions 
about the statutory housekeeping project’s purpose and operation).  
 100. Judges bear the primary responsibility for selecting opinions to sub-
mit through the project in the Second, Third, Fourth, Fifth, and Ninth Cir-
cuits. E-mail from Patricia Connor, Clerk of Court, U.S. Court of Appeals for 
the Fourth Circuit, to author (Dec. 6, 2013, 13:11 CST) (on file with author); 
Telephone Interview with Molly Dwyer, Clerk of Court, U.S. Court of Appeals 
for the Ninth Circuit (Dec. 16, 2013); E-mail from Thomas B. Plunkett, Chief 
Deputy Clerk of Court, U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit, to author 
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lack of attention to the project probably best explains low par-
ticipation in it. That said, given the many obligations and de-
mands upon appellate judges and their staff,101 judicial una-
wareness or inattention to the project should not be considered 
proof of judicial negligence by any means.  
The relative obscurity of the statutory housekeeping pro-
ject can at least partly be attributed to its original design as a 
low-visibility “transmission-belt” for opinions.102 The project’s 
low visibility may have the advantage of making judges who 
know about the project more comfortable with sending opinions 
because their participation is unlikely to be publicly perceived 
as criticism of Congress or as interference with that body’s leg-
islative duties.103 Yet, it also hampers the project’s effectiveness 
by reducing judges’ exposure to it, thereby making it less likely 
that the project will be meaningfully used by all of the cir-
cuits.104 Despite some awareness-raising efforts,105 there is some 
evidence that judges remain unfamiliar with the project.106 This 
suggests that such awareness-raising efforts for the housekeep-
ing project can be significantly improved and that any suggest-
ed change to the project must be sensitive to the many obliga-
tions and responsibilities of the federal judiciary.  
 
(Dec. 16, 2013, 15:34 CST) (on file with author); E-mail from Carol L. Trama, 
Admin. Assistant to the Clerk, U.S. Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit, to 
author (Dec. 9, 2013, 15:31 CST) (on file with author); Letter from Catherine 
O’Hagan Wolfe, Clerk of Court, U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, 
to author (Dec. 16, 2013) (on file with author). Even in circuits where court 
staff may choose which opinions to submit, judges, especially the chief judge, 
usually have some input. See, e.g., E-mail from Betsy Shumaker, Clerk of 
Court, U.S. Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit, to author (Dec. 10, 2013, 
10:02 CST) (on file with author) (approval of three judge panel required before 
opinion may be submitted); E-mail from Annette B. Young, Exec. Assistant & 
Circuit Mediation Adm’r, U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit, to au-
thor (Dec. 16, 2013, 12:38 CST) (on file with author) (Senior Staff Attorney se-
lects with review by Chief Judge).  
 101. E-mail from Russell Wheeler to author, supra note 8 (“[A]ppellate 
judges have plenty else on their minds, and it doesn’t occur to them to submit 
relevant opinions.”). 
 102. See Katzmann & Herseth, supra note 26, at 2193 (describing the in-
tended low-visibility of the project). 
 103. See Katzmann & Wheeler, supra note 1, at 138 (“The project puts min-
imal burdens on the courts.”). 
 104. See Memorandum from Russell Wheeler to author, supra note 6, at 1 
(breaking down judicial participation in the statutory housekeeping project). 
 105. See, e.g., Feedback, supra note 7, at 4.  
 106. See E-mail from Russell Wheeler to author, supra note 8; E-mail from 
Russell Wheeler to author, supra note 99. 
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Moreover, the project appears to be a relatively low priority 
for judges and court staff. Although nearly every circuit clerk of 
court polled has a procedure for submitting opinions,107 few 
seem to avail themselves of these procedures.108 This seeming 
inconsistency may partly be explained by circuit clerks and 
staff attorneys narrowly interpreting the project’s requirements 
in order to prioritize other court business. Several clerks of 
court mentioned that their circuits rarely encounter opinions 
that qualify for the project, suggesting that they read the statu-
tory housekeeping project’s guidelines to only apply to especial-
ly egregious statutory flaws.109 These narrow interpretations of 
the project’s guidelines may be a result of a lack of clarity in 
the project’s guidelines or institutional pressures to limit time 
spent on the project in order to attend to other court business. 
Whatever the underlying reason, certain circuits’ narrow view 
of the housekeeping project’s scope demonstrates that even 
many of those aware of the project are rarely using it. This 
suggests that judicial underuse of the housekeeping project 
may be partially attributable to both a lack of prioritization 
and a lack of awareness of the project. 
Separation of powers concerns probably also discourage 
participation.110 Such judicial reservations would be grounded 
in “the combined force of constitutionally mandated separation 
of powers, [judicial] codes of ethics, and a general sense of insti-
 
 107. E-mail from Christie L. Cavanaugh, Admin. Specialist to Clerk of 
Court, U.S. Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit, to author (Dec. 9, 2013, 
09:22 CST) (on file with author); E-mail from Patricia Connor to author, supra 
note 100; E-mail from Christopher Conway, Admin. Attorney, U.S. Court of 
Appeals for the Seventh Circuit, to author (Dec. 6, 2013, 09:48 CST) (on file 
with author); Telephone Interview with Molly Dwyer, supra note 100; Tele-
phone Interview with Michael E. Gans, Clerk of Court, U.S. Court of Appeals 
for the Eighth Circuit (Dec. 16, 2013); E-mail from Stacy Kennon, U.S. Court 
of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit, to author (Dec. 10, 2013, 14:39 CST) (on 
file with author); E-mail from Thomas B. Plunkett to author, supra note 100; 
E-mail from Betsy Shumaker to author, supra note 100; E-mail from Carol L. 
Trama to author, supra note 100; E-mail from Annette B. Young to author, 
supra note 100.  
 108. See supra notes 79–83, 88–93 and accompanying text. 
 109. See, e.g., Telephone Interview with Michael E. Gans, supra note 107; 
E-mail from Betsy Shumaker to author, supra note 100 (mentioning that the 
submission procedure does not come up often). 
 110. E-mail from Russell Wheeler to author, supra note 8 (“[S]ome [appel-
late judges] may be aware of the project but believe, despite its endorsement 
by the Judicial Conference and Administrative Office, that it’s unseemly for 
judges to be communicating with Congress in a way that might be perceived 
as criticism.”). 
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tutional propriety.”111 The Constitution prohibits judges from 
issuing advisory opinions about potential bills, thereby limiting 
the kinds of communications judges can make to legislators 
about statutory defects.112 The constitutional separation of pow-
ers doctrine also encourages judges to avoid making statements 
that might prejudice future issues that could later come before 
them.113 The perceived importance of a wholly independent ju-
diciary further encourages judges to avoid engaging in commu-
nication with Congress altogether, whether such communica-
tion is actually contrary to the constitutional principle of 
separation of powers or deliberately designed to avoid such a 
violation.114  
Separation of powers concerns deserve greater attention 
because of the significant role they may play in discouraging 
participation in the housekeeping project. Critics of the project 
may believe that it upsets the well-defined constitutional roles 
of the judicial and legislative branches by encouraging judicial 
overreaching. A closer look at the housekeeping project reveals, 
however, that it raises no significant constitutional problems.115  
The quintessential separation of powers violation involves 
an attempt by one branch to usurp the functions of another.116 
Critics of the statutory housekeeping project may argue that 
judges impermissibly intrude upon Congress’s domain when 
they submit opinions discussing statutory flaws through the 
project. According to this view of separation of powers, Con-
 
 111. Shirley S. Abrahamson & Gabrielle Lessard, Interbranch Communica-
tions: The Next Generation, in CONFERENCE ON ASSESSING THE EFFECTS OF 
LEGISLATION ON THE WORKLOAD OF THE COURTS: PAPERS AND PROCEEDINGS 
11, 11 (A. Fletcher Mangum ed., 1995). For a brief history of interbranch 
communication between the judicial and legislative branches, see Deanell 
Reece Tacha, Judges and Legislators: Renewing the Relationship, 52 OHIO ST. 
L.J. 279, 279–90 (1991) (arguing that the framers of the United States Consti-
tution anticipated interbranch dialogue, and pointing to early examples of that 
type of dialogue). 
 112. See Hayburn’s Case, 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) 409 (1792); ROBERT A. 
KATZMANN, COURTS AND CONGRESS, 85 (1997); see also United Pub. Workers 
of Am. (C.I.O.) v. Mitchell, 330 U.S. 75, 89 (1947) (“[T]he federal courts, estab-
lished pursuant to Article III of the Constitution, do not render advisory opin-
ions.”). 
 113. KATZMANN, supra note 112, at 85; Abrahamson & Lessard, supra note 
111, at 11. 
 114. KATZMANN, supra note 112, at 85; Abrahamson & Lessard, supra note 
111, at 11. 
 115. See infra Part II.C.1. 
 116. See, e.g., Bowsher v. Synar, 478 U.S. 714, 726–27 (1986) (discussing 
the “dangers of congressional usurpation of Executive Branch functions”).  
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gress, and not the judiciary, is responsible for examining feder-
al statutes and determining whether they have any flaws worth 
remedying.  
The main problem with this criticism of the housekeeping 
project is that it is based on a misunderstanding of how the 
housekeeping project operates. Pursuant to their Article III au-
thority to adjudicate cases, judges interpret statutes and write 
opinions discussing their reasoning for those interpretations.117 
The housekeeping project gives judges and judicial staff a way 
to transmit those reasoned judicial opinions to Congress; it does 
not provide them a means to editorialize about policy mat-
ters.118 Judges and judicial staff participating in the project 
communicate about statutory issues of mutual concern. They do 
not propose bills, enact legislation, or otherwise act like legisla-
tors. Thus, to reject the housekeeping project on separation of 
powers grounds is to ignore both how the project actually works 
and its great potential to encourage interbranch understand-
ing.  
Judicial codes of conduct may also help explain low judicial 
participation. Ethical juridical codes generally prohibit ex parte 
communications,119 limit the public comments a judge may 
make during a pending or impending proceeding,120 and restrict 
extrajudicial activity.121 Encouraging ethical behavior by judges 
is certainly not an unreasonable goal; supporters of the house-
keeping project recognize the importance of ethical judicial 
conduct.122 Moreover, as the comments to Rule 3.1 of the Model 
Code of Judicial Conduct point out, “Judges are uniquely quali-
fied to engage in extrajudicial activities that concern the law, 
the legal system, and the administration of justice . . . .”123 This 
judicial experience is especially apparent in the area of tech-
 
 117. See U.S. CONST. art. 3; KATZMANN, supra note 112, at 46 (“Among the 
tasks judges face . . . is to construe the meaning of statutes . . . .”). 
 118. See Katzmann & Wheeler, supra note 1, at 137 (describing the process 
for submitting opinions through the statutory housekeeping project and noting 
how judicial opinions are sent to Congress without substantial commentary 
from judges or judicial staff).  
 119. Tacha, supra note 111, at 292–93. 
 120. Id. at 293. 
 121. Id. at 293–94. 
 122. See Katzmann & Wheeler, supra note 1, at 137–38 (describing how the 
statutory housekeeping project was structured to avoid the appearance of in-
appropriate communications by judges). 
 123. MODEL CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT R. 3.1 cmt. 1 (2010). 
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nical statutory defects given that judges interpret statutes on a 
daily basis.124  
Despite this room for interbranch communication within 
ethical behavior, judicial codes of conduct functionally discour-
age such communication by only giving vague guidelines for 
how to communicate with the legislative branch.125 In the ab-
sence of specific guidelines for interbranch communication, 
“judges will continue to err on the conservative side by isolating 
themselves from public and private debate on current issues,”126 
even when those issues are “not impending or pending in a case 
before the courts.”127 Thus, judicial codes of conduct simultane-
ously leave room for judicial participation in the statutory 
housekeeping project and discourage that participation by not 
providing clear guidelines for what types of judicial behavior 
are and are not appropriate in the realm of interbranch com-
munication.  
The low visibility of the project combined with a heavy ju-
dicial workload and institutional concerns with interbranch 
communications thus combine to discourage participation. 
Supplementation and expansion of the project can help deal 
with those problems, encourage greater judicial participation, 
improve interbranch communication, and help the project 
achieve both its intended goals and broader interbranch com-
munication objectives. 
B. LEGISLATIVE USE OF THE FEDERAL STATUTORY 
HOUSEKEEPING PROJECT IS NARROW IN FOCUS 
On the legislative side, the federal statutory housekeeping 
project is mainly used narrowly by legislative drafters to im-
prove their drafting skills. This limited use of the project in 
Congress is likely due to congressional members’ inattention to 
technical statutory matters and legislative drafters’ low visibil-
ity roles. The narrow legislative use of the housekeeping project 
limits its effectiveness as an interbranch communication tool. 
1. Use by Legislators 
Since the housekeeping project’s launch, members of Con-
gress aware of the project have generally been receptive to it 
 
 124. Tacha, supra note 111, at 294. 
 125. Id. at 294–95. 
 126. Id. 
 127. Id. at 295. 
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and have publicly encouraged its use. Congressional leadership 
endorsed the project in the early 1990s when it began128 and the 
attempted revitalization of the project in 2007 was spurred in 
part by the House and Senate Judiciary Committees.129 Never-
theless, congressional response to problems highlighted by the 
statutory housekeeping project has been hard to find.130 Con-
gress enacted amendments to two of the provisions mentioned 
in three of the forty-six recently submitted judicial opinions.131 
However, it is not clear that the amendments were spurred by 
the project, and neither Congressional Legislative Counsel of-
fice is aware of any efforts by legislators to address other statu-
tory flaws described in the submitted opinions.132 Advocates of 
the housekeeping project do not see this lack of congressional 
response as a real cause for concern; in their view, the aim of 
the project is to transmit opinions highlighting technical flaws 
in statutes rather than to correct those flaws through statutory 
revision.133  
However, limiting the project to the goal of highlighting 
technical flaws rather than correcting them hinders the pro-
ject’s ability to help fix gaps, ambiguities, and other technical 
flaws that currently exist and may continue to cause problems 
 
 128. See Katzmann & Herseth, supra note 26, at 2193–94 (describing ini-
tial congressional endorsement of the statutory housekeeping project). 
 129. Letter from Representative John Conyers, Jr., Chairman, U.S. House 
Judiciary Comm., and Representative Lamar S. Smith, Ranking Member, U.S. 
House Judiciary Comm., to M. Pope Barrow, Jr., Legislative Counsel, U.S. 
House Office of Legislative Counsel (May 23, 2007) (on file with author); Let-
ter from Senator Patrick Leahy, Chairman, U.S. Senate Judiciary Comm., and 
Senator Arlen Specter, Ranking Republican Member, U.S. Senate Judiciary 
Comm., to James Fransen, Legislative Counsel, U.S. Senate Office of Legal 
Counsel (Feb. 14, 2007) (on file with author). 
 130. Bellis, supra note 40, at 2213; see Memorandum from Russell Wheeler 
to author, supra note 6, at 2 (noting that it is unclear whether congressional 
amendments to two provisions mentioned in recently submitted opinions are 
attributable to the project). 
 131. See Memorandum from Russell Wheeler to author, supra note 6, at 2; 
see also E-mail from Russell Wheeler to author, supra note 76. This analysis of 
congressional action did not directly include the four most recently submitted 
opinions, but there is little reason to believe this trend of congressional inac-
tion has not continued. See id. 
 132. Memorandum from Russell Wheeler to author, supra note 6, at 2. 
 133. Katzmann, supra note 10, at 692–93 (noting that the primary purpose 
of the statutory housekeeping project is “not to produce legislative change”); 
Telephone Interview with M. Douglass Bellis, supra note 8 (describing how 
individual congressional response is not realistic); E-mail from Russell 
Wheeler to author, supra note 8 (“[The statutory housekeeping project’s] goal 
is not and never was to achieve statutory revision.”).  
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for judges.134 This limited transmission goal restricts the 
housekeeping project’s usefulness as a tool of interbranch 
communication since it deemphasizes the two-way dialogue 
that could result from suggestion and correction.135 
2. Use by Drafters 
Before describing the housekeeping project’s use by legisla-
tive drafters, it is important to distinguish between policymak-
ing and drafting. Members of Congress typically focus on policy 
rather than the specific text of statutes.136 The nonpartisan, 
specialized drafters in the Offices of Legislative Counsel are re-
sponsible for much of the statutory language that ends up be-
coming law.137 Members of Congress and their staff may decide 
upon general policy concepts, outlines, or bullet points, but “the 
Legislative Counsels typically turn those ideas into statutory 
text.”138 This general rule similarly applies for committee staff 
who frequently have their statutes checked or completely draft-
ed by the legislative drafters in the Offices of Legislative Coun-
sel.139  
Because the Offices of Legislative Counsel draft the majori-
ty of statutes, their participation in the housekeeping project is 
critical to its success. There is substantial evidence that legisla-
tive drafters appreciate the project.140 They use opinions sub-
mitted through the project to help train staff attorneys and 
identify drafting issues to be avoided in future statutes.141  
Although the statutory housekeeping project’s positive im-
pact on legislative drafting is important, the project’s narrow 
focus limits its utility significantly. If the only goal of the 
 
 134. See Cardozo, supra note 12, at 115–16 (discussing the necessity of leg-
islative action to produce lasting resolutions of ambiguities). 
 135. See Bellis, supra note 40, at 2214. 
 136. Gluck & Bressman, supra note 4, at 908. 
 137. Id. at 967–68. 
 138. Id. at 968.  
 139. Id. at 1020. 
 140. Telephone Interview with M. Douglass Bellis, supra note 8 (explaining 
how the House Legislative Counsel Office finds the statutory housekeeping 
project very helpful); see E-mail from Russell Wheeler to author, supra note 8 
(mentioning the Legislative Counsel Offices’s continued support for the statu-
tory housekeeping project).  
 141. Telephone Interview with M. Douglass Bellis, supra note 8 (describing 
the House Legislative Counsel Office’s use of the statutory housekeeping pro-
ject to train staff); see Burk, supra note 47, at 2217 (detailing the Senate Leg-
islative Counsel Office’s use of the statutory housekeeping project to train staff 
during its pilot project period). 
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housekeeping project were to train staff attorneys in the Offices 
of Legislative Counsel, then that goal could be furthered simply 
by finding judicial opinions discussing technical flaws in stat-
utes on electronic legal databases and using them as teaching 
tools. If the housekeeping project only had that narrow goal of 
training drafters, it would be much more efficient to rely on 
those legal databases rather than involve courts and judges.  
What sets the housekeeping project apart and gives it spe-
cial significance is its ability to foster interbranch communica-
tion between Congress and the judiciary, something a simple 
search in a legal database cannot do. Thus, the housekeeping 
project should also focus on that broader goal through encour-
aging judicial submission of opinions and subsequent congres-
sional response that would represent real two-way dialogue. 
3. Reasons for the Project’s Narrow Use  
A lack of direct congressional response to flaws highlighted 
through the statutory housekeeping project stems largely from 
congressional inattention to judicial opinions and technical 
statutory matters. Members of Congress rarely read court cas-
es.142 When they do, they usually concern themselves with the 
substantive outcomes of judicial opinions rather than with 
technical drafting issues.143 Legislators and their staff are 
therefore unlikely to pay attention to the kinds of opinions 
submitted through the project. Even if they do, they may be 
satisfied with the judges’ interpretation, believing that they are 
“making good decisions in hard cases” and see no reason for 
congressional intervention.144 
Moreover, for the reasons elucidated by Pound, drafting er-
rors are unlikely to receive attention from Congress.145 Since 
statutes revising flawed statutory language are incredibly 
technical and rarely excite legislators or constituents, they are 
significantly harder to pass, something especially true in the 
current Congress, where passing legislation in general is a sig-
nificant challenge.146 These institutional barriers to congres-
 
 142. Telephone Interview with M. Douglass Bellis, supra note 8 (stating 
that few people in Congress ever read court cases). 
 143. See Proceedings of the Forty-Ninth Judiciary Conference of the D.C. 
Circuit, 124 F.R.D. 241, 323–24 (1989) (describing how legislative staff tend to 
focus on the outcomes of court cases if they pay much attention to them at all). 
 144. Bellis, supra note 40, at 2213. 
 145. See Pound, supra note 16, at 638 (suggesting the Congressional atten-
tion to “[g]reat social questions” leaves little room for focus elsewhere). 
 146. Telephone Interview with M. Douglass Bellis, supra note 8 (mention-
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sional participation in the housekeeping project limit the pro-
ject’s ability to actually fix the statutory problems it presents. 
Though such barriers are not completely insurmountable, their 
link to the culture of Congress may mean that a substantial 
shift would need to occur to overcome them. 
The Offices of Legislative Counsel, the bodies that probably 
use the statutory housekeeping project the most of anyone in 
the legislative branch, are subject to a number of institutional 
constraints, such as their attorney-client relationship with leg-
islators and technical roles,147 which ultimately prevent them 
from ensuring the effectiveness of the housekeeping project as a 
two-way interbranch communication tool. Legislative drafters’ 
behind-the-scenes roles restrict their ability to lobby for greater 
use of the project, encourage statutory revision, address more 
broad-ranging inconsistencies between legislative drafting and 
judicial interpretation of statutes,148 or even track what hap-
pens to opinions once they reach subcommittee and committee 
staff.149 As such, legislative drafters simultaneously have one of 
the best understandings of the housekeeping project and one of 
the worst abilities to do much to improve or expand it. Their 
narrow use of the project is limited even further by the low and 
uneven rates of participation by the judiciary150 as fewer sub-
mitted opinions translates into fewer issues spotted and avoid-
ed in future drafting. 
This is not meant to suggest that the institutional struc-
ture of the Offices of Legislative Counsel should be fundamen-
tally changed. Rather, the earlier discussion highlights the 
room the statutory housekeeping project has to grow while 
demonstrating why legislative drafters are not well-situated to 
encourage that growth. The current legislative use of the feder-
al statutory housekeeping project narrowly benefits certain fu-
ture legislative drafting, but leaves a great deal of the project’s 
 
ing how the current political environment in Congress has made it difficult to 
pass legislation). 
 147. See Burk, supra note 47, at 2218 (discussing how the attorney-client 
relationship between the Senate Legislative Counsel’s Office and legislators 
limits actions that the office can take). 
 148. See Gluck & Bressman, supra note 4, at 930–33 (noting the incon-
sistency between a number of the canons of statutory construction judges use 
and how statutes are actually drafted).  
 149. See Burk, supra note 47, at 2218 (discussing how the attorney-client 
privilege between the Senate Legislative Counsel’s Office and committees lim-
its reporting and review). 
 150. See supra Part II.A.1 (reviewing uneven participation rates among the 
circuit courts). 
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potential untapped. Indeed, the “statutory housekeeping pro-
ject” name is a misnomer given the lack of legislative action.151 
Since good housekeeping does not merely involve pointing out 
messes today in the hopes of preventing others in the future, it 
is difficult to conceive of the project today as “housekeeping” 
given that no statutes have actually been “cleaned up” because 
of it.152  
C. THE FEDERAL STATUTORY HOUSEKEEPING PROJECT HAS 
UNMET POTENTIAL WORTH EXPLORING 
Although it has yet to cause the improvements in 
interbranch communication hoped for when it was launched, if 
used effectively, the statutory housekeeping project has sub-
stantial promise. 
1. Effective Interbranch Communication Benefits Both 
Statutory Interpretation and Drafting 
Interbranch communication is not only a helpful way to 
keep each branch informed about the other, it can also diffuse 
tensions between the legislative and judicial branches. Recent 
scholarship indicates that courts have not kept pace with re-
cent changes in legislative process, including developments in 
legislative procedure, the use of staff, committee reports, and 
lobbying practices.153 These changes all have implications for 
statutory interpretation. Reliance on outmoded conceptions of 
Congress may lead judges to misunderstand statutes through 
the application of statutory interpretation techniques grounded 
in assumptions about the legislative process and legislative in-
tent that are no longer accurate.154 On the legislative side, 
members of Congress are still generally uninformed about the 
judiciary’s capacity to handle its workload or on the statutory 
interpretation problems that statutes can cause.155 Keeping the 
 
 151. Supra note 146 and accompanying text. 
 152. See supra note 56 and accompanying text (reviewing the original pur-
pose of the project: improving the drafting process for future legislation). 
 153. Russell Carparelli, Separate Powers—Shared Responsibility: Con-
structing Avenues of Interbranch Communication, 85 DENV. U. L. REV. 267, 
270 (2007) (highlighting the importance of communication regarding evolu-
tions within the branches of government); Vetri, supra note 97, at 178. 
 154. Gluck & Bressman, supra note 4, at 933–40, 967–78 (reviewing incon-
sistencies between canons and the drafting process, as well as misperceptions 
regarding the use of legislative history). 
 155. Vetri, supra note 97, at 178 (noting that legislators are not kept in-
formed about the judicial workload). 
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judicial and legislative branches well-informed encourages for-
ward-thinking drafting and statutory interpretation that better 
captures legislative intent. 
Aside from facilitating the sharing of information between 
the legislative and judicial branches, interbranch communica-
tion can also ease tensions. The relations between judges and 
legislators are especially tense today.156 Recent criticism of con-
troversial judicial decisions has been particularly harsh.157 
Rhetoric, “[r]eflecting anger, distrust, and misunderstanding of 
the judicial process . . . tends to increase the politicization of 
the judicial system . . . [and] promotes public disrespect for the 
rule of law,” discouraging recognition of the judiciary as a co-
equal branch.158 In this environment of intense criticism of the 
judiciary, building avenues of interbranch communication is 
crucial to encouraging cooperation and understanding between 
the legislative and judicial branches.159 While the idea of the ju-
dicial and legislative branches as being wholly isolated has a 
long history,160 judicial legitimacy is improved rather than 
hampered by interbranch communication because such efforts 
help to restore respect for that branch.161  
The legislative and judicial branches have a shared re-
sponsibility for the quality of statutes,162 a duty they can both 
better fulfill when they engage in healthy dialogue. 
2. The Statutory Housekeeping Project Is a Worthwhile Tool 
for Enhancing Interbranch Communication 
The federal statutory housekeeping project is well-situated 
to facilitate the interbranch communication that is so needed 
today. The housekeeping project already exists, has been en-
dorsed by major figures from Congress and the federal judici-
 
 156. Russell R. Wheeler & Robert A. Katzmann, A Primer on Interbranch 
Relations, 95 GEO. L.J. 1155, 1156–57 (2007). 
 157. Carparelli, supra note 153, at 269. 
 158. Id. at 269–70. 
 159. Id. at 270.  
 160. See, e.g., Cardozo, supra note 12, at 114 (discussing how the legislative 
and judicial branches move in “proud and silent isolation”). 
 161. See Carparelli, supra note 153, at 270 (“[T]he vehemence of current 
debate regarding the role of the courts increases the need for legislatures and 
courts to build more avenues of communication and to ensure that they are 
well used.”). 
 162. Shirley S. Abrahamson & Robert L. Hughes, Shall We Dance? Steps 
for Legislators and Judges in Statutory Interpretation, 75 MINN. L. REV. 1045, 
1047 (1991).  
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ary,163 and has enjoyed some use.164 Building upon the statutory 
housekeeping project is easier than starting a new program. 
The pre-existing project has also been specially tailored to 
avoid the separation of powers concerns that other programs 
may encounter.165 
Critics of an expansion of the housekeeping project may 
argue that the project does not need to be expanded. The Offic-
es of Legislative Counsel appreciate the housekeeping project 
in its current state and have not recently suggested a need for 
substantial change.166 Moreover, advocates of the project have 
generally accepted its more limited scope and have not focused 
on seeking congressional response to the statutory flaws pre-
sented by it.167 However, these arguments for keeping the stat-
utory housekeeping project in its current state are difficult to 
reconcile with the low and uneven judicial participation in the 
project.168 If the housekeeping project is somewhat helpful when 
it is used infrequently and unevenly by the legislative and judi-
cial branches,169 then supplementing and expanding the project 
to increase participation will likely make it even more useful.  
It is also worth noting that the project still has not ad-
dressed some of its problems first recognized during the pilot 
project period, such as its unclear standards for submitting 
opinions170 and lack of two-way communication.171 Adjusting the 
statutory housekeeping project now may be a way to help fur-
ther its goals. Since the framers of the housekeeping project 
developed it in the broader context of interbranch communica-
tion and statutory revision programs,172 a more expansive pro-
ject will not depart significantly from its original objectives 
and, in fact, will help achieve them. 
 
 163. Katzmann & Herseth, supra note 26, at 2193–94. 
 164. Memorandum from Russell Wheeler, supra note 6, at 1; see also 
Katzmann & Herseth, supra note 26, at 2194–96 (discussing use of the project 
by the D.C. Circuit during its pilot period).  
 165. See supra note 122.  
 166. Telephone Interview with M. Douglass Bellis, supra note 8 (asserting 
that, from his perspective, there are no real deficiencies in the statutory 
housekeeping project). 
 167. See supra note 140 and accompanying text. 
 168. See Memorandum from Russell Wheeler, supra note 6, at 1; E-mail 
from Russell Wheeler to author, supra note 75. 
 169. See supra note 140 and accompanying text. 
 170. See Burk, supra note 47, at 2218. 
 171. Bellis, supra note 40, at 2214. 
 172. See supra note 10 and accompanying text.  
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III.  IMPROVING THE STATUTORY HOUSEKEEPING 
PROJECT: INSPIRATION FROM STATE PROGRAMS   
The federal statutory housekeeping project’s great deal of 
untapped potential as an interbranch communication tool calls 
for its modification and expansion, especially in light of today’s 
crucial need for better communication between Congress and 
the federal judiciary.173 Existing interbranch communication 
programs in the states offer ways to improve the federal house-
keeping project. 
Section A of this Part describes why state interbranch 
communication programs are fruitful sources of suggestions for 
improving the federal statutory housekeeping project despite 
the differences between state and federal legislatures and judi-
ciaries. Section B draws on the state programs mentioned in 
Section A to propose a three-pronged approach to improve the 
statutory housekeeping project that involves: (1) increasing 
two-way feedback between the federal judiciary and legislative 
drafters within the federal project; (2) formalizing the project; 
and (3) supplementing it with educational programs. While 
each of these three proposals would also be helpful inde-
pendently, they have the best chance of increasing the effec-
tiveness of the statutory housekeeping project if they are im-
plemented together. 
A. STATE INTERBRANCH COMMUNICATION PROGRAMS ARE 
USEFUL SOURCES OF INSPIRATION FOR THE FEDERAL PROJECT 
A number of interbranch communication and statutory re-
vision programs, both formal and informal, exist in the 
states,174 some of which predate the statutory housekeeping 
project.175 These state interbranch communication programs, 
particularly those aimed at the discovery and revision of statu-
tory flaws, provide helpful examples for the federal statutory 
 
 173. See supra notes 157–63; see also supra Part II.C.1 (describing the ben-
efits of interbranch communication). 
 174. Carparelli, supra note 153, at 270–75 (describing a number of state 
and regional interbranch communication programs implemented since 1989). 
For an earlier comprehensive examination of state programs of legislative dis-
course with the courts, see Abrahamson & Hughes, supra note 162, at 1045–
93. 
 175. See, e.g., About the Commission, N.Y. ST. L. REVISION COMMISSION, 
http://www.lawrevision.state.ny.us/index.php (last visited Nov. 17, 2014) (not-
ing that the New York State Revision Commission, created in 1934, “is the 
oldest continuous agency in the common-law world devoted to law reform 
through legislation”).  
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housekeeping project. Since state interbranch communication 
programs take slightly different approaches from one anoth-
er,176 they offer a variety of options already tested in the “labor-
atories of democracy.”177 
Of course, the different constitutional, structural, and po-
litical realities of state legislative and judicial branches some-
what limit a state-federal analogy in the context of interbranch 
communication. For instance, some state constitutions give 
their judiciaries an express duty to improve the administration 
of justice that includes highlighting statutes that need to be re-
vised,178 while other states allow judges to give advisory opin-
ions to legislators.179 Concerns about judges delving too far into 
the political and legislative realms may be less serious in the 
many states that elect their judges180 rather than appoint them 
as in the federal system.181 State legislatures also possess more 
flexibility than Congress does to experiment with interbranch 
communication projects, particularly legislator-judge statutory 
revision committees, because they meet less often and thus leg-
islators potentially have more time to devote to such activi-
ties.182 Although some state interbranch communication pro-
grams may succeed because of the aforementioned unique state 
 
 176. See Abrahamson & Hughes, supra note 162, at 1051–88 (discussing 
the nuances of state programs). 
 177. See New State Ice Co. v. Liebmann, 285 U.S. 262, 310–11 (1932) 
(Brandeis, J., dissenting) (articulating the idea that states serve as laborato-
ries of democracy). 
 178. E.g., IDAHO CONST. art. V, § 25 (laying out the system whereby state 
district judges have a special duty to report “defects or omissions in the laws” 
to the justices of the Idaho Supreme Court who then make an annual report 
on the same topic to the governor and legislature); ILL. CONST. art.VI, § 17 (es-
tablishing an annual judicial conference for the Illinois Supreme Court justic-
es to consider the work of the courts, suggest improvements in the administra-
tion of justice, and communicate those suggestions to the Illinois General 
Assembly). 
 179. See, e.g., Jonathan D. Persky, “Ghosts That Slay”: A Contemporary 
Look at State Advisory Opinions, 37 CONN. L. REV. 1155, 1166–72 (2005) 
(providing an overview of state advisory opinion history and practice). 
 180. See Methods of Judicial Selection, AM. JUDICATURE SOC’Y, 
http://www.judicialselection.com/judicial_selection/methods/selection_of_ 
judges.cfm (last visited Nov. 17, 2014) (describing the different methods of ju-
dicial selection in each state). 
 181. See U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 2 (setting out the appointment process 
for federal judges); id. art. III, § 1 (stating that federal judges have life tenure 
and shall hold their offices during good behavior). 
 182. See Telephone Interview with M. Douglass Bellis, supra note 8 (noting 
that state legislatures are very different bodies from Congress, in part because 
they meet less frequently than Congress does). 
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circumstances or be unrealistic to implement on the federal 
level,183 their general outlines are still useful. In fact, state pro-
grams influenced earlier proposed federal projects184 and pro-
vided a foundation for the statutory housekeeping project it-
self.185 These useful models, however, have been recently 
neglected by participants in the federal project.186 Those in-
volved in the housekeeping project have neither drawn upon 
state programs to improve the federal project nor have they 
formally suggested any alternative ways to improve the house-
keeping project that rival the state-based suggestions set out 
below.187  
B. SUGGESTIONS FOR IMPROVING THE STATUTORY 
HOUSEKEEPING PROJECT 
A three-part plan to boost two-way feedback within the 
federal statutory housekeeping project, increase the visibility 
and formality of the project, and supplement the project with 
educational programs can help the housekeeping project meet 
its original goal of being an effective “transmission belt”188 and 
tool of interbranch communication.  
1. Boosting Two-Way Feedback 
In the current housekeeping project, two-way communica-
tion between the legislative and judicial branches is slight,189 a 
 
 183. It is unlikely that, for example, the U.S. Constitution would be 
amended to modify the separation of powers or expressly implement an 
interbranch communication program. Id. (discussing the difficulty of passing a 
constitutional amendment). 
 184. Friendly, supra note 14, at 802–04 (basing the proposed revision 
committee on the New York Law Revision Commission). 
 185. Proceedings of the Forty-Ninth Judiciary Conference of the D.C. Cir-
cuit, 124 F.R.D. 241, 317 (1989) (mentioning Maryland’s interbranch commu-
nication program). 
 186. See Telephone Interview with M. Douglass Bellis, supra note 8 (men-
tioning that state revision and interbranch communication programs are not 
participants’s major focus in the statutory housekeeping project); see also Tel-
ephone Interview with Matthew Lee Wiener, supra note 92 (mentioning that 
state programs are not really on the Administrative Conference’s radar). 
 187. The limited attention the housekeeping project has received in recent 
years focused on publicizing the project rather than formally proposing ways 
to change it. See, e.g., Katzmann & Wheeler, supra note 1, at 131; Katzmann, 
supra note 10, at 691–92. 
 188. See Katzmann & Herseth, supra note 26, at 2193. 
 189. See Burk, supra note 47, at 2217–18 (mentioning a lack of clarity 
about how committee staff used submitted opinions during the pilot project 
period); Telephone Interview with M. Douglass Bellis, supra note 8 (describing 
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problem noted during the project’s early days.190 Some state 
statutory revision programs encourage dialogue between judges 
and legislators through revision committees that include mem-
bers of both branches.191 Federal notions of separation of pow-
ers192 and the many demands on judges’ and federal legislators’ 
time probably preclude the use of such panels,193 at least in the 
context of statutory revision. Those state programs point, how-
ever, to the importance of making judges, court staff, legislative 
drafters, and legislative policymakers feel like they are valua-
ble participants in an ongoing interbranch conversation.194  
One way to encourage communication without deviating 
too wildly from the statutory housekeeping project’s original fo-
cus as a “transmission belt”195 would be to develop a second 
transmission system and make information about judicial par-
ticipation in the project more accessible to both branches. Leg-
islative drafters, committee staff, and other members of the leg-
islative branch who choose to participate would submit 
information, briefly summarized on an annual or semi-annual 
basis, about what they did with opinions submitted through the 
statutory housekeeping project to the federal judiciary and to 
each other. This second transmission system would help shed 
light on how submitted opinions are handled. If reporting in the 
second transmission belt shows tangible results of submitting 
opinions it could also encourage judicial participation in and 
prioritization of the housekeeping project.196 Even if the second 
transmission system reveals that legislative staff are not using 
the opinions or do not find certain aspects of the housekeeping 
project helpful, it could pinpoint areas for improvement in the 
 
how submitted opinions are transmitted to subcommittee staff). 
 190. Bellis, supra note 40, at 2214. 
 191. See, e.g., Connecticut Law Revision Commission, CONN. GEN. ASSEM-
BLY, http://www.cga.ct.gov/lrc (last visited Nov. 17, 2014); Oregon Law Com-
mission, WILLAMETTE U. C. OF L., http://www.willamette.edu/wucl/centers/olc 
(last visited Nov. 17, 2014); Welcome to the Alabama Law Institute, ALA. L. 
INST., http://www.ali.state.al.us (last visited Nov. 17, 2014). 
 192. See Abrahamson & Lessard, supra note 111, at 11 (describing the in-
fluence of separation of powers on judges’ concerns about the appropriateness 
of interbranch communication). 
 193. See E-mail from Russell Wheeler to author, supra note 8; supra notes 
16, 145 and accompanying text. 
 194. Carparelli, supra note 153, at 270. 
 195. See Katzmann & Herseth, supra note 26, at 2193. 
 196. See supra notes 107–10 and accompanying text. 
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project that would otherwise be unknown to other participants 
in the project such as judges and judicial staff.197 
Greater accessibility to information about which opinions 
have been submitted through the housekeeping project would 
assist this second transmission belt by better informing those 
in Congress. Thus, a second transmission system should be ac-
companied by reports about the nature of judicial participation 
in the housekeeping project by the Administrative Office of the 
U.S. Courts publicly available on its website.198  
Those with knowledge of the low judicial and legislative 
participation in the housekeeping project may claim that a se-
cond transmission system would be unhelpful because it would 
add more work for potential participants without ensuring in-
creased participation. In isolation, this might be true; however, 
the formal statute199 and educational programs200 discussed be-
low would be aimed at boosting both the rate and quality of 
participation in the housekeeping project.  
A second transmission system would capitalize on that in-
creased participation by giving those on the legislative side a 
means to communicate with the federal judiciary on a more 
equal basis.201 It would also help clarify what impact the sub-
mitted opinions do or do not have in Congress and improve the 
availability of information about the project.202  
2. Increasing the Visibility and Formality of the Project 
Further formalizing the housekeeping project through a 
statutory enactment of the project may help encourage judges 
 
 197. Bellis, supra note 40, at 2214 (describing the lack of communication 
from Congress back to the judiciary). 
 198. The Administrative Office of the U.S. Courts is a natural choice for 
reporting on the housekeeping project on the judicial side since it already per-
forms annual reports on the federal courts, including the judicial business of 
the U.S. Courts of Appeals. See, e.g., Annual Report of the Director 2013, AD-
MIN. OFF. OF THE U.S. CTS., http://www.uscourts.gov/Statistics/ 
JudicialBusiness/2013.aspx (last visited Nov. 17, 2014) (describing the annual 
report on the judicial business of federal courts in 2013). Given that the Gen-
eral Counsel of the Administrative Office of the U.S. Courts receives opinions 
submitted through the project, it also should not be too difficult for it to make 
reports about judicial participation in the housekeeping project, especially if it 
enlists the help of the Governance Institute. See Katzmann & Wheeler, supra 
note 1, at 137 (describing the role of the Administrative Office of the U.S. 
Courts in the statutory housekeeping project).  
 199. See infra Part III.B.2. 
 200. See infra Part III.B.3. 
 201. See supra note 154 and accompanying text. 
 202. See supra note 189. 
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and court staff to participate by boosting its visibility and reas-
suring those who are uneasy about taking part. While a statute 
will not rid judges and court staff of their many responsibilities, 
it may help them prioritize the project by giving it more credi-
bility and attention. Many state statutory revision and 
interbranch communication programs are based on statutory or 
constitutional authority,203 to which administrators of those 
programs can point if their legitimacy or propriety is ques-
tioned.204 A statute formally authorizing the statutory house-
keeping project could encourage judges and court staff to par-
ticipate by reassuring them that the project is a permitted form 
of communication with Congress. It also comes with the added 
benefit of clarifying often unclear rules about interbranch 
communication that tend to discourage judges from participat-
ing.205  
Critics of such a broad authorizing statute may argue that 
the lack of judicial participation in the housekeeping project 
calls for a stricter statute that would include enforcement 
mechanisms for circuits that do not actively participate. Alt-
hough such a statute would likely draw judicial attention to the 
project, sanctions against non-participating circuits would be 
against the spirit of free interbranch dialogue206 and may pre-
sent separation of powers issues not implicated by a voluntary 
project formalized through a flexible statute. The political reali-
ty of Congress today,207 and legislators’ general inattention to 
technical statutory matters,208 may make the enactment of any 
statute difficult, especially one that would require significant 
enforcement efforts or sophisticated drafting.  
 
 203. See supra notes 174, 178 and accompanying text. 
 204. The statutory authority for state interbranch communication and re-
vision programs is often listed prominently on their websites. See, e.g., Michi-
gan Law Revision Commission, MICH. LEGIS. COUNCIL, http://council 
.legislature.mi.gov/CouncilAdministrator/mlrc (last visited Nov. 17, 2014); 
Connecticut Law Revision Commission, supra note 191; Oregon Law Commis-
sion, supra note 191; Welcome to the Alabama Law Institute, supra note 191. 
 205. Tacha, supra note 111, at 295 (“Perhaps judges would be less wary 
[about interbranch communication] if specific interactions could be measured 
against guiding principles that take into account the relevant constraints but 
still encourage communication.”). 
 206. For example, it is difficult to see how Congress’s sanctioning of circuits 
that do not actively participate would ease tensions between the judicial and 
legislative branches. See supra notes 157–63 and accompanying text. 
 207. See supra note 146 (describing how difficult it is to pass legislation in 
the current Congress). 
 208. See supra note 145 (discussing how members of Congress tend to focus 
on more emotional and less technical issues). 
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Though the barriers to enacting a technical statute may 
make formally authorizing the statutory housekeeping project 
less feasible than the two other suggestions for reforming the 
housekeeping project, a statute would greatly help the other 
two reforms by boosting the project’s visibility and credibility.  
3. Supplementing the Project with Educational Programs 
Though educational programs need not be expressly tied to 
the housekeeping project, federal legislative-judicial symposi-
ums and trainings are a helpful way to improve each branch’s 
understanding of the other’s approach to statutes, thereby facil-
itating a more nuanced use of the federal project. Wisconsin 
has been a leader in interbranch relations educational projects 
on the state level, employing several different programs, in-
cluding direct meetings between its Supreme Court and legisla-
ture’s judiciary committees and legislative-judicial symposi-
ums, one of which expressly discussed statutory 
interpretation.209 The Chief Justice of the Wisconsin Supreme 
Court, the Director of State Courts, and the Supreme Court’s 
Legislative Liaison have also spoken during legislator orienta-
tion sessions about how the court works and how judges inter-
pret statutes210 and some legislators have seen how judges op-
erate firsthand through “Judicial Ride-Alongs.”211  
Interbranch educational programs on the federal level 
could be helpful even if they are less expansive than those in 
Wisconsin. Adding the topic of statutory drafting to the Federal 
Judicial Center’s existing judge and court staff orientations212 
and developing trainings for legislative staff regarding how 
federal judges interpret statutes may go a long way toward in-
creasing understanding without requiring major disruptions of 
either branch.213 Such trainings would be especially useful for 
addressing gaps in knowledge about each branch if they fea-
 
 209. E-mail from Nancy Rottier, Legislative Liaison, Wis. Supreme Court, 
to author (Sept. 27, 2013, 17:34 CDT) (on file with author). 
 210. Id. 
 211. In the “Judicial Ride-Along” program, legislators spend half of one day 
on the bench with a circuit judge from their district. Interbranch Communica-
tion: The Wisconsin Plan, WISCONSIN COURT SYSTEM (Dec. 2012), http://www 
.wicourts.gov/courts/resources/docs/communications.pdf. 
 212. See Educational Programs & Materials, FED. JUD. CENTER, http:// 
www.fjc.gov (last visited Nov. 17, 2014) (listing educational programs the FJC 
already organizes for federal judges and court staff).  
 213. The federal statutory housekeeping project’s minimal burdens on its 
participants has been touted as one of its major strengths. See Katzmann & 
Wheeler, supra note 1, at 138. 
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tured either retired or current members of the other branch, 
just as a former justice of the Wisconsin Supreme Court led 
that state’s legislative-judicial symposium on statutory inter-
pretation.214 Greater understanding on the part of both branch-
es resulting from those educational programs would make them 
a useful supplement to the statutory housekeeping project that 
may help remedy problems of underuse. 
Although such supplemental educational programs, a fed-
eral statute, and a two-way feedback mechanism each inde-
pendently offer a way to improve and expand the federal statu-
tory housekeeping project, they work best together. The 
increased visibility and credibility that a federal statute could 
bring would help boost participation in the second feedback 
mechanism, participation made more meaningful by education 
programs that allow participants to better understand the nu-
ances of the other branch. As such, these three suggestions 
should ideally be implemented together as a three-part plan.215 
  CONCLUSION   
Even though statutes dominate many areas of law today, 
legislators and judges are not on the same page. High tensions 
between the two branches merely compound that problem. In 
these circumstances the federal statutory housekeeping pro-
ject’s unique statutory communication focus gives it renewed 
and added importance. Yet, judicial and legislative participa-
tion in that project has not met the need for interbranch com-
munication. Those who are familiar with the statutory house-
keeping project tend to find the opinions submitted through the 
project helpful but few are using it. The project remains full of 
unrealized potential as a tool for interbranch communication. 
An examination of a number of state interbranch commu-
nication and statutory revision programs offers a source of in-
spiration for how to improve the federal statutory housekeeping 
project. Modifying and supplementing that project through a 
second transmission system, an authority granting statute, and 
interbranch educational programs can help the statutory 
housekeeping project achieve its original goals and better 
bridge the gap between judicial and legislative understandings 
of statute drafting and interpretation. The benefits this three-
 
 214. E-mail from Nancy Rottier to author, supra note 209. 
 215. As noted above, the formalizing statute may be more difficult to im-
plement than the other two proposals. See supra notes 207–09. 
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part plan will bring are potentially far reaching; an effective 
federal statutory housekeeping project is well-situated to pro-
mote interbranch communication and understanding, which is 
of vital importance in a legal system dominated by statutes.  
 
